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INTRODUCTION 
Obtaining a patent is only one step in the journey. There is a 
plethora of paths that a patent owner can take, including licensing or 
assigning their patent rights to others. The question then  
becomes what powers and rights does that licensee or buyer have? 
Can the licensee or buyer bring infringement suits based on those 
patents? Do they need to join the original patent owner to do so? As 
was outlined in Standing with a Bundle of Sticks: The All  
Substantial Rights Doctrine in Action (“Standing with a Bundle  
of Sticks”),1 courts look to the “all substantial rights” standard to  
answer those questions. 
This Supplement to the prior Article provides a brief update on 
the all substantial rights doctrine in view of the Federal Circuit’s 
recent decision in Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech-
nology Corp.2 This Supplement begins by summarizing the all sub-
stantial rights doctrine framework, specifically highlighting which 
rights within the bundle have been found to be most important. This 
Supplement then examines Lone Star, concluding that the Court’s 
holding fits within the framework that was previously established 
by the Federal Circuit and discussed in Standing with a Bundle  
of Sticks. 
I. THE ALL SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 
It is a long-established principle that a patent confers a “bundle 
of rights” which grants the patentee certain powers and protections, 
including the power to retain all rights or divide and assign portions 
of those rights.3 However, only the owner of all substantial rights in 
the patent may bring suit to enforce the patent on its own, without 
the need to join another party. The issue of who owns all the sub-
stantial rights, and therefore who may bring suit on its own, often 
 
1 Mark J. Abate & Christopher J. Morten, Standing with a Bundle of Sticks: The All 
Substantial Rights Doctrine in Action, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 477 
(2018) [hereinafter Standing with a Bundle of Sticks]. 
2 925 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
3 Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (noting that a patent provides its owner with “a bundle of rights which may be 
divided and assigned, or retained in whole or part”). 
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arises when an exclusive licensee desires to bring an infringe- 
ment action. 
Federal Circuit decisions, including WiAV Solutions LLC v. 
Motorola, Inc., recognize that an exclusive licensee has constitu-
tional standing to sue an infringer.4 However, in order for a  
party to bring suit on its own, it must also satisfy additional standing 
concerns, known as the “prudential standing” doctrine.5 The Su-
preme Court in Allen v. Wright stated: 
Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-
imposed limits on the exercise of federal juris- 
diction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s 
raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring 
adjudication of generalized grievances more appro-
priately addressed in the representative branches, and 
the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law  
invoked.6 
Courts have considered numerous prudential standing concerns in 
the context of patent infringement.7 Ultimately, however, “the ques-
tion is ‘who owns the patent?’”8 To answer this question, the Federal 
Circuit looks to see which rights in the bundle have been transferred 
and whether the buyer possesses all substantial rights. 
A. The Most Important Rights in the Bundle: The Right to 
Enforce, The Right to Indulge, and The Right to Alienate 
Although no singular right is dispositive, the Federal Circuit has 
developed a pattern of analyzing which rights are the most  
crucial in determining who possesses all substantial rights in the pa-
tent.9 Among the numerous rights conferred to patent owners,10 one 
right in particular has risen to the top of the list as the most 
 
4 Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 482. 
5 E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); see also 
Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 483. 
6 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
7 Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 483–85. 
8 Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. Miracle Optics, Inc., 434 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
9 See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 488–91. 
10 Id. 
2020] THE ALL SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE 1189 
 
important: the right to enforce the patent. Courts have consistently 
held that agreements which provide a buyer an unencumbered right 
to enforce the patent is indicative of the buyer holding all substantial 
rights. Similarly, courts have held time after time that hindrances on 
the ability of a buyer to sue alleged infringers is a strong indication 
that all substantial rights were not transferred.11 For example, in Ab-
bott Laboratories v. Diamedix Corp., the Federal Circuit held that 
an exclusive licensee possessed less than all substantial rights in a 
patent, given that, inter alia, the licensee was “obligated under the 
agreement not to ‘prejudice or impair the patent rights [of the licen-
sor] in connection with [the licensee’s own litigation].’”12 The Court 
concluded that the licensee “may not sue on its own for infringe-
ment,”13 acknowledging that the exclusive right to sue is “particu-
larly dispositive.”14 
Second to the right to enforce and of potentially equal  
importance15 is the right to indulge infringement, i.e., the right to 
allow infringement. In Alfred E. Mann Foundation for Scientific Re-
search v. Cochlear Corp., the agreement allowed the licensor  
to bring an infringement suit against an alleged infringer if the  
licensee chose not to.16 The Federal Circuit held that “[b]ecause [the 
 
11 See, e.g., Diamond Coating Techs. v. Hyundai Motor Amer., 823 F.3d 615, 620–21 
(Fed. Cir. 2016); Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 
1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Sicom Sys., Ltd. v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 427 F.3d 971, 978–
79 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Abbott Labs. v. Diamedix Corp., 47 F.3d 1128, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
12 Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132 (quoting the agreement at issue in the case); see also, 
e.g., Diamond Coating Techs., 823 F.3d at 620–21 (noting that the seller retained 
significant control over the buyer’s enforcement and litigation activities transferring only 
limited enforcement rights, and concluding on the basis of this and other factors that fewer 
than all substantial rights had been transferred); Clouding IP, LLC v. Google Inc., 61 F. 
Supp. 3d 421, 434 (D. Del. 2014) (holding that an exclusive licensee possessed fewer than 
all substantial rights in a patent, given that, inter alia, the licensor could “circumvent [the 
licensee’s] decision to allow infringement and, instead, bring suit directly as a counter-
plaintiff”). 
13 Abbott Labs., 47 F.3d at 1132. 
14 Id. (quoting Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 
870, 875–76 (Fed. Cir. 1991)); see also Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 
496. 
15 See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1 at 499; see also Abbott Labs.,  
47 F.3d at 1132 (observing that “the right to indulge infringements . . . normally 
accompanies a complete conveyance of the right to sue”); Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978 
(noting the holding in Abbott Labs). 
16 604 F.3d at 1362–63. 
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licensee] cannot indulge infringements for an unlimited time . . . 
[the licensee] holds substantially less than the complete right  
to sue.”17 
Lastly, a licensee’s power to alienate (e.g., to sell, transfer, or 
reassign) its rights in the patent is arguably the next most important 
stick in the bundle.18 If an agreement places significant restrictions 
or limitations on the power to assign full rights in the patent to a 
future buyer, the agreement is unlikely to be found to transfer all 
substantial rights.19 
The Federal Circuit’s precedent leading up to Lone Star is fairly 
clear that, while the totality of factors must be considered, meaning-
ful restrictions on the buyer’s right to enforce the patents beyond 
those already in existence are very likely to prevent the transfer of 
all substantial rights in the patent. Therefore, the question this Sup-
plement endeavors to answer next is: Did the holding in Lone Star 
change this precedent? 
B. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp. 
The Federal Circuit’s decision and reasoning in Lone Star fits 
squarely within the framework developed in its previous cases and 
again highlights the importance of an unfettered right to enforce  
the patents in the analysis of whether all substantial rights have  
been transferred. 
1. Background 
The dispute in Lone Star arose from a patent transfer agreement 
(“Agreement”) between Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC (“Lone 
Star”) and Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (“AMD”).20 The Agree-
ment purported “to transfer ‘all right, title and interest’ in the patents 
to Lone Star.”21 However, the Agreement also included several 
 
17 Id. at 1363. 
18 Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 498. 
19 See, e.g., Sicom Sys., 427 F.3d at 978–79 (finding that a licensor’s retention of a right 
to veto an exclusive licensee’s attempts to reassign its license was concordantly a factor in 
finding that all substantial rights had not been transferred). 
20 Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019). 
21 Id. 
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notable limitations on Lone Star’s rights.22 For example, the Agree-
ment only allowed Lone Star to assert the patents against the “Unli-
censed Third Party Entit[ies]” specifically listed in the Agreement.23 
The Agreement also allowed AMD, without Lone Star’s approval, 
to sublicense the covered patents to any unlisted entity that Lone 
Star sues.24 Additionally, the Agreement limited Lone Star’s power 
to assign the patents, i.e., the power to alienate, as well as allow the 
patents to enter the public domain.25 It is also noteworthy that the 
Agreement required Lone Star to share with AMD between 35 and 
50 percent of any revenue it generated from licensing the patents.26 
In late 2016, Lone Star filed six related infringement suits 
against parties specifically listed as Unlicensed Third Party Entities 
in the Agreement.27 Each of the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
the complaint on the basis that Lone Star had no standing to sue 
under the Agreement.28 In reaching its decision, the district court 
concluded that AMD did not transfer all substantial rights in the pa-
tents to Lone Star, and therefore Lone Star could not sue in its own 
name alone. 29 In the view of the district court, the “essence of this 
problem is that the patent owner tried to find a way to shield itself 
from counterclaims while retaining a way to reap the monetary ben-
efits of suing competitors and others for infringement of its pa-
tents.”30 The district court subsequently dismissed all six cases and 
Lone Star appealed.31 
 
22 In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, No. C 17-03980 WHA, 2018 WL 500258, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Lone Star Silicon Innovations 
LLC v. Semiconductor Mfg. Int’l Corp., No. 2018-1578, 2018 WL 3869293 (Fed. Cir. June 
12, 2018), appeal dismissed sub nom. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Toshiba Corp., 
No. 2018-1578, 2018 WL 3869301 (Fed. Cir. July 2, 2018), and vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225 (Fed. 
Cir. 2019). 
23 Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1227–28. 
24 Id. at 1228. 
25 Id. 
26 Id.; In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, 2018 WL 500258, at *1. 
27 In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, 2018 WL 500258, at *1. 
28 Id. 
29 Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1228–29. 
30 In re Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC, 2018 WL 500258, at *1. 
31 Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1229 (2019). 
The district court also denied Lone Star’s request to join AMD into the case as the Court 
concluded “that doing so would ‘reward Lone Star for its litigation gimmick and unfairly 
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2. All Substantial Rights Analysis 
At the heart of the Federal Circuit’s analysis was whether or not 
Lone Star possessed all substantial rights and therefore could sue in 
its own name. However, before diving into its analysis, the Court 
again emphasized the unimportance of the form or labels included 
in a transfer agreement.32 Although the Agreement purported to 
transfer “all right, title and interest” in the covered patents, the Court 
emphasized that the “analysis in these types of cases has never been 
so reliant on labels.”33 Instead, as the Court has done previously, it 
examined the “totality” of the Agreement and whether it “reflects a 
transfer of all substantial rights in the asserted patents.”34 
As discussed above, “[the Court has] often focused on two  
salient rights; enforcement and alienation.”35 These are arguably the 
two most important rights in the bundle. When the Court  
examined Lone Star’s ability to enforce, it noted the limitations 
placed upon them by the Agreement. If Lone Star desired to file suit 
against any entity that was not specifically listed as “unlicensed” it 
would need to seek AMD’s consent.36 In other words, the Agree-
ment did not provide a list of all unlicensed entities or simply iden-
tify some unlicensed entities, but rather the Agreement limited Lone 
Star’s ability to sue without AMD’s permission to only those entities 
listed in the exhibit. The Court labeled this a “hunting license.”37 
The Court also noted that this enforcement restriction was cou-
pled with AMD’s unrestricted right to sublicense the patents to any 
unlisted litigation targets of Lone Star, and therefore indulge  
infringement, which made Lone Star’s enforcement powers 
 
prejudice defendants.’” Id. However, the Federal Circuit determined that “[u]ltimately once 
the district court correctly concluded that AMD did not transfer all substantial rights in the 
asserted patents to Lone Star, the district court should have considered whether AMD could 
have been or needed to be joined before dismissing this case. Its failure to do so was legally 
erroneous.” Id. at 1238–39. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal and 
remanded with an instruction that it consider whether AMD must be joined here. Id. at 
1239. 
32 Lone Star, at 1229; see Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1 at 507–08. 
33 Lone Star at 1230. 
34 Id. at 1231. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 1233. 
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“illusory, at least in part.”38 Thus, the Agreement went beyond pro-
hibiting Lone Star from suing any party that had a preexisting li-
cense, which in any event Lone Star could not do under the law,39 
and instead limited Lone Star’s ability to sue only certain listed  
entities. Further, the Agreement was more than a seller reserving the 
right to sublicense to its affiliates or those with whom it has a spec-
ified business relationship.40 The Federal Circuit had previously 
held that the retained right to sublicense affiliates is significantly 
less important in the all substantial rights analysis than a seller’s  
retained right to enforce the patent.41 
Notably, the Court was not convinced by Lone Star’s argument 
that restrictions on unlisted entities were irrelevant because all six 
defendants were Unlicensed Third Party Entities. As the Federal 
Circuit has previously held, the all substantial rights analysis is not 
limited to the factual situation of the case before the court, but  
rather, it considers the effect the agreement has on all substantial 
rights, including those not at issue. The fact that a party “transferred 
some rights, with respect to certain entities, does not mean it trans-
ferred all substantial rights in the full scope of the patent.”42 Limit-
ing the licensee’s rights to enforce the patents to a specified list is 
analogous to an exclusive “field of use” license, which restricts the 
licensee’s use of the patent to a defined product or to a set geo-
 
38 Id. at 1231. 
39 See, e.g., Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 522 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (explaining that license agreements “run with the patent” and are binding on 
subsequent owners of the patent). 
40 Cf, Luminara Worldwide, LLC v. Liown Elecs. Co., 814 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2016). 
41 See id. at 1350–51. The Court in Luminara concluded that Disney Enterprise’s 
retained right to grant sublicenses to third-party affiliates (including any entity operated by 
or under a license from The Walt Disney Company), did not preclude the transfer of all 
substantial rights to Luminara. Id. Thus, Disney Enterprises’s retained right to license the 
patent to third parties was not a substantial right, for the purposes of the all substantial 
rights analysis. Id. The Court also stated that “[t]he retained right to practice a patent is not 
the same as a retained right to exclude others from doing so.” Id. at 1351. 
42 Lone Star Silicon Innovations LLC v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1232 
(2019).  
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graphical area.43 These “field of use” limitations have previously 
been found “fatal” to the transfer of all substantial rights.44 
Just as Lone Star had limitations placed on its ability to enforce 
the patents, so too was its power to alienate restricted.45 First, Lone 
Star was only allowed to transfer its rights to a third party if that 
party agreed to be bound by the same enforcement restrictions as 
Lone Star.46 Again, Lone Star was required to obtain AMD’s con-
sent if it wished to transfer the patents unencumbered.47 The Court 
found that “[n]ot only does this substantially restrict Lone Star’s 
ability to transfer the patents, it ensures that AMD will always con-
trol how the patents are asserted”48 because, as discussed above, the 
Agreement limited Lone Star’s ability to sue without AMD’s per-
mission for all but those specifically listed entities. Thus, in evalu-
ating the totality of the circumstances, any restriction on  
alienation must be read in the context of the entire agreement.  
Second, the Court found that the requirement that Lone Star assign 
the patents back to AMD before abandoning the patents was a limit 
on Lone Star’s ability to alienate the patent that had the same impact 
as the limit on transfer.49 These two restrictions in this Agreement 
did much more than require that Lone Star comply with the law or 
existing contractual obligations. Once again, in this context, the lim-
itations placed on Lone Star’s power to do what it wished with the 
patents was “fundamentally inconsistent with a transfer of all sub-
stantial rights.”50 
The Federal Circuit also considered other aspects of the Agree-
ment and found that these further supported the conclusion that Lone 
Star did not have all substantial rights. One such factor was the 
Agreement providing AMD with a significant share in any licensing 
revenue Lone Star obtained for these patents, the Federal Circuit 
 
43 See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1, at 492 n.69. 
44 See, e.g., Alps S., LLC v. Ohio Willow Wood Co., 787 F.3d 1379, 1383–84 (Fed. Cir. 
2015). 
45 Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1232; see also Datatreasury, at 1372. 
46 Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1232. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 1233. 
49 See id. 
50 Id. 
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having previously held that “the fact that [the transferor] retains a 
substantial share of the proceeds is consistent with [transferor’s] re-
taining ownership rights in the patent . . . .”51 
In sum, when Lone Star licensed the patents from AMD it did 
not receive an unfettered right to enforce the patents. The limitations 
placed on Lone Star, including what the Court considered two of the 
most important rights within the bundle, led the Court to conclude 
that AMD did not transfer all substantial rights in the patents. There-
fore, Lone Star could not assert the patents in its own name alone. 
The case was remanded to the district court with an instruction 
to consider whether AMD must be joined to continue the case.52 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s decision in Lone Star fits squarely within 
the framework previously established by the Federal Circuit under 
the all substantial rights doctrine. Lone Star further makes clear the 
most important rights within the bundle and reiterates that only  
the owner of all substantial rights in the patent may bring suit on  
its own.53 
Further, the holding in Lone Star highlights important consider-
ations for patent practitioners. Specifically, when structuring agree-
ments, parties who desire that the licensee be allowed to bring an 
infringement suit in its name alone should be mindful of the rights 
within the “bundle” that the Federal Circuit has made clear are the 
most important and ensure that those rights remain unencumbered 
by restrictions or limitations imposed by the licensor.54 The Court’s 
decision in Lone Star has further emphasized the importance of a 
licensee or buyer’s unfettered right to enforce their patents, indulge 
infringement, and alienate their patents. 
 
 
51 Id. (quoting Propat Int’l Corp. v. Rpost, Inc., 473 F.3d 1187, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
52 Lone Star, 925 F.3d at 1239. 
53 See Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1 at 481. 
54 See generally Standing with a Bundle of Sticks, supra note 1. 
